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Summary 
 
We discuss the exploitation of a well established replenishment rule, the order-up-to 
policy to control the supply chain risk resulting from the bullwhip effect.  To avoid 
this risk within supply chains, two specific recommendations are highly important.  
Firstly we provide strong evidence that availability of high fidelity up-to-date delivery 
lead time information is essential.  This inevitably requires transparency and trust 
between various “players” within the supply chain.  For many practical reasons this is 
easier to recommend than to actually achieve.  Secondly, such reliable data needs to 
be automatically fed into the replenishment system to enable it to function in an 
adaptive mode.  This step offers a reasonable guarantee of well controlled 
performance.  It is also advisable that at the design stage, replenishment rule 
parameters should be set so that “conservative” operation is achieved.  The new 
theoretical advances described in the paper are validated via simulation models of the 
delivery process. 
 
Key words:   Bullwhip, Inventory variance, lead-times, lead-time estimation errors, 
stability, APIOBPCS 
 
1.  Introduction 
In this paper we study how supply chain risks may affect company profits by 
increasing lead times and inducing bullwhip problems.  To achieve this goal we first 
review the concept of bullwhip, and its distinguished predecessor, demand 
amplification.  The latter phenomenon was superbly demonstrated via simulation by 
Jay Forrester, (1958) “the Prophet of Unintended Consequences” (Fisher, 2005).  
Nearly four decades later Lee et al, (1997) coined the “bullwhip” phrase to describe 
similar events.  The latter terminology has since become extremely popular. However, 
this phenomenon is particularly well known to economists (Mitchell, 1923), and 
Chandler (1990) has quoted an example occurring in the Proctor and Gamble supply 
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chain as far back as 1919.  Such “boom and bust” behaviour can be extremely costly, 
as the seminal study by Metters (1997) has established.  He shows it can easily add 
30% on-costs at a single stage in the supply chain.  Since the “domino” effect is very 
strong in such a scenario it follows that the risk to profit is high. 
 
To minimise this bullwhip risk it is essential to realise the practical limitations of real-
world supply chain operations.  Firstly lead times may occasionally be relatively 
small but they are non-zero.  However it is also important to emphasise that for 
smooth supply chain operations they need to be both reasonably short and consistent 
and known.  Secondly, demand cannot be perfectly forecasted as has been adequately 
demonstrated, even in the relatively stable world of the sale of Japanese motor 
vehicles (Mollick, 2004).  Hence the practical need for compressing delivery lead 
times (Stalk and Hout, 1990) which in turn drastically reduce forecasting errors 
(Watson, 1993).  Such a goal is thereby very simply summarised, but much more 
difficult to achieve in the extended enterprise.  This is because there may be many 
echelons present between raw material supplier and end customers.  Hence there will 
be conflicting vested interests targeted to suit individual businesses.  So, regrettably, 
not all “players” are necessarily aiming for the goal of end customer satisfaction via 
establishing and maintaining a seamless delivery system (Towill, 1997). 
 
This practical scenario is exacerbated because individual decision makers such as a 
production scheduler or store manager may be responsible for overseeing the 
processing of orders for several thousand stock keeping units (SKU’s) every week, or 
may be, even every day.  Hence the need for robust autonomic Decision Support 
Systems (DSS) becomes paramount.  Typically such a decision maker would expect 
to process, say, 95% of such orders algorithmically.  The remainder may require 
further detailed consideration on such grounds as criticality to business or unusual 
supplier scenarios.  The last thing required in such a high pressure activity is the 
breakdown of such an algorithmic routine.  The system is then in severe danger of 
overload as the apparently “routine” SKU’s become a real-time problem.  This often 
leads to a panic reaction and consequently poor decision making. 
 
In a previous paper we have provided suitable DSS guidelines to select and 
parameterise these replenishment rules so as to avoid bullwhip occurring (Disney and 
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Towill, 2006a).  These recommendations worked extremely well under conditions 
where actual lead-times and perceived lead-times were matched.  In this paper we 
extend the theory to predict system response where a mismatch occurs.  This could be 
by an accident within a factory, by a machine or transport problem or due to “players” 
withholding such information.  We show that such a situation considerably increases 
the possibility of bullwhip occurring.  Hence the risk of profits being lost due to the 
bullwhip phenomenon is now very much greater.  By extending our knowledge of 
system stability we demonstrate how such risk is kept under control. 
 
 
1.1. Demand amplification in the real world 
Since the seminal simulation based research of Forrester (1958), there has been 
considerable activity in this field as typified by Christenson and Brogan, (1971), 
Roberts (1981), Wikner et al (1991), van Ackere et al, (1993) and Sterman, (2000).  
But what actually happens in the real world of business and commerce?  Figure 1 is a 
typical example of demand amplification occurring in a supermarket (Jones et al, 
1997).  Retail sales appear by eye to be reasonably constant over the time period 
observed.  However there is clearly some variation with the extreme swings being 
approximately ± 25% of average sales.  But variance of the orders placed on the 
suppliers is much larger.  Now the extreme swings are roughly ± 50% of average 
sales.  In other words, based on deviations about the observed average, the bullwhip 
evident in this simple scenario is about 2:1.   
 
However the volatile realities for transportation in the supply chain are much more 
extreme.  If the supplier delivers exactly what is ordered by the retailer, his 
requirements for trucks will vary by even more than 2:1.  For example, the capacity 
needed could drop to as low as, say, three trucks but can rise as high as six trucks.  In 
contrast, if the supplier was required to replenish sales as they actually occur only 
three to five trucks are required; although four trucks would be adequate for most 
deliveries. This variation as seen in the UK retail sector example appears largely 
random, maybe with some evidence of “bunching” orders to the supplier.   
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Figure 1.  Bullwhip occurring in a UK supermarket supply chain  
(Source: Jones et al, 1997) 
 
In contrast the “spikiness” of the pattern of behaviour evident in Figure 2 is clearly 
due to an “event”.  The cause is a big annual marketing push resulting in the self-
evident peak and subsequent to the discounted sales promotion (Fisher et al, 1997).  
So although the actual US consumption of Campbell’s Soups is clearly seasonal, with 
a very strong winter component roughly centred at Christmas, the orders become 
highly distorted.  Thus the shipments that are needed to ensure delivery to retail 
outlets has peaked by twice the maximum actual consumption and as much as four 
times the average sales rate.  Even more spectacularly, the shipments peak is nineteen 
times the low values as recorded between weeks 34 to 41.  This is bound to result in a 
significant amount of unnecessary costs at several echelons. The consequence of this 
discounted sales promotion may be an apparent short term increase in market share.  
But this is achieved at the expense of necessitating a highly distorted pipeline 
impacting on every business in the supply chain.  So it is not surprising that bullwhip 
scenarios get rapidly worse not better as we look at the complete picture. 
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Figure 2.  Price discount induced bullwhip in Campbell’s Soups supply chain  
(Source: Fisher et al, 1997) 
A simple conceptual model of a clothing supply chain is shown in Figure 3.  Materials 
and products flow downstream and orders flow upstream from echelon to echelon.  
Each echelon (retailer: garment maker: fabric maker: and yarn maker) is subject to 
delays in process.  It also needs to make a decision on passing orders to “their” vendor 
in the light of such information as “orders” received from “their” customer, work-in-
progress and stock levels, Stalk and Hout (1990).  Hence it can take many months for 
a complete cycle of orders to pass up the chain to the original source and for the 
corresponding products to flow down to the marketplace especially if overseas 
outsourcing is used (Lowson, 2001).  So, by the time the goods actually arrive in the 
shops the customer probably wants something quite different to what was originally 
forecast (Mansell, 2002).  Bullwhip is an almost inevitable consequence of such a 
long and protracted chain, with every “player” double-guessing on what is really 
required.  
 
In Figure 3 we have arbitrarily shown the bullwhip increasing by a factor of 2:1 as 
orders pass across each interface.  This is actually modest compared to these results 
reported by Forrester (1958) or van Ackere et al (1993).  Since bullwhip tends to be 
multiplicative, this means that across the complete supply chain the demand 
amplification is likely to be 8:1.  This is regrettably typical of real-world supply 
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chains.  Again, this is not a new phenomenon, as the excellent early description of 
bullwhip occurring in the retail sector testifies (Mitchell, 1923). 
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Figure 3. Generation of bullwhip in a clothing supply chain 
(Source:  Stalk and Hout, 1990) 
 
A relatively crude (but extremely valuable) set of bullwhip estimates within a 
European confectionary supply chain have been published by Holmström (1997).  
These are shown in Table 1.  The demand amplification measure used here is the 
statistical metric of the variance estimated at each stage.  Since under certain 
conditions variances multiply it can be seen that the total effect throughout the chain 
is quite horrendous.  But in this real-world supply chain the production scheduler 
manifestly reacts differently to orders for these two sample products.  Either due to 
market intelligence or just gut feeling, he realises that the high volume product is a 
relatively stable seller.  So he sensibly adopts a level scheduling strategy on orders 
arriving at the factory from the wholesalers.  Such a decision may well help reduce 
acquisition on-costs.  But, of course, it may incur some hidden costs, such as those 
due to lost business resulting from stock-outs.   
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Business interface 
across which 
demand 
amplification 
occurs 
High volume, low margin 
product 
Low volume, high margin
Product 
Estimated 
demand 
amplification 
Comments 
on 
volatility 
Estimated 
demand 
amplification 
Comments 
on 
volatility 
Shop orders/ 
Purchases 2.60 High level 3.14 High level 
Wholesaler/  
Shop orders 2.88 High level 3.05 High level 
Factory orders/ 
Wholesaler 0.72 Smoothed 2.39 High level 
Deliveries from 
factory/  
Factory orders 
1.67 Medium level 1.25 Modest level 
 
Table 1. Estimated European confectionary supply chain variance 
(Source:  Holmström, 1997) 
 
1.2. Bullwhip risk reduction via action and information  
 
Figure 4 shows the conceptual problem tackled in this paper.  For finite demand 
variance and a finite lead-time there will be either order variance, and/or inventory 
variance.  Both sources contribute on-costs in the delivery system, and hence drive 
down profit.  Now it is possible to implement an appropriate Decision Support System 
(DSS) which will minimise such costs where the lead-time is known (and fixed), and 
the demand statistics are available.  Unfortunately it is easy to induce bullwhip into 
such a situation via a poor choice of DSS algorithm and/or unsuitable parameter 
settings.  The upside of this argument is clear, however.  With the requisite 
information available, it is straightforward to achieve low bullwhip and low on-costs 
(from this source) by knowledgeable DSS selection and good timing of the algorithm.  
Furthermore it may also be reasonably robust to some changes in operating conditions 
(Disney and Towill, 2006a). 
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Figure 4. The influence of supply chain risk on bullwhip related costs 
 
Regrettably, in the real-world the operating conditions will rarely remain fixed.  What 
should the supplier company then do?  There are two lines of action recommended to 
reduce the risk of added bullwhip costs impinging negatively upon profits.  The first 
is action to minimise change.  Hence on the demand side there should be interaction 
with customers so as to avoid excessive peaks and troughs in their orders placed.  In 
other words wherever possible the self-smoothing demand is an integral part of 
company strategy (as is indeed the case with the Toyota Production System, Suzaki 
1987).  But there can also be appropriate action taken on the incoming value streams 
from our vendors.  Hence when US stevedores industrial action interfered with 
component supplies, Dell despatched special task forces to both local and overseas 
docksides.  This was to ensure that wherever and whenever possible, loading and 
unloading of Dell components and sub-assemblies were highly prioritised (Holzner, 
2006).  Additionally, if necessary, aircraft were chartered to help protect the supply 
system against any such disruptions.  At the first sign of trouble they would be 
reserved for Dell use.  
 
Other possible activities which maybe similarly classified as extended action to 
reduce the risk of on-costs include pro-active searches for alternative vendors and re-
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distribution of supplier business between the existing ones (Nishiguchi and Beaudet, 
1999).  The latter initiatives were indeed taken by Toyota when their sole supplier of a 
key brake sub-assembly business was temporarily incapacitated because of a major 
factory fire.  However this pathway to risk reduction via interaction with customers 
and suppliers in the manner described is a separate issue and is not further discussed 
in this paper.  Nor is the associated principle of “substitution” considered further.  In 
the latter venture there is a strong endeavour to replace a sub-assembly (with 
disrupted deliveries) with the nearest equivalent (which may have ample stock 
available).  This concept could even be extended to the salesman persuading the 
customer that there are advantages in his purchasing an old model (in stock) as being 
superior for purpose to the newly advertised model.  Unbeknown to the client the 
updated version may well have major components immobilised elsewhere around the 
world because of a stevedore’s strike (Papadakis, 2003). 
 
Interesting and valuable that such actions are, attention in this paper is concentrated 
on the other complementary pathway for reducing bullwhip induced on-costs risk.  
This is the information pathway, in which lead-time updates are automatically 
exploited within the DSS.  Davenport (2006) looks forward to the full implementation 
of the IT age in business.  He paints a highly relevant scenario in which companies 
compete on the basis of their analytic capability.  In such a state of operation the type 
of information usage we propose should become endemic.  Consequently this paper 
concentrates on the important principle of reducing risk or excessive bullwhip on-
costs via close monitoring of actual lead-times.  
 
These estimates are fed into an adaptive update of the DSS within the replenishment 
feedback loop (Towill et al, 1997).  The latter system was developed pragmatically.  
Herein we test the principle widely via a range of operating scenarios based on typical 
industrial data.  This amply demonstrates the improvements made possible via lead-
time adaptive controls.  Additionally we provide a novel stability theory which 
considerably aids understanding of “best” parameter settings.  Hence the action 
information pathway is shown to be readily implemented.  It is consistent with, and 
complementary to any action pathway which the extended enterprise is engineering. 
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1.3.   Contribution of this paper 
In supply chain operations there is an inevitable trade-off between the “physical” (that 
is, acquisition) costs, and the “market mediation” or implicit costs.  The latter can be 
well hidden from view at times of stable market conditions.  However there are many 
times some which are unrecognisable when it will dominate the supply chain Product 
Delivery Process (PDP) costs.  The Fisher et al, (1997) equation is: 
 costs PDP mediationMarket costs PDP  Physicalcosts PDPchain supply Total          (1)                                
 
where the physical PDP costs include all production, distribution, storage and similar 
costs, and the market mediation PDP costs include all obsolescence stock-out and 
similar costs. 
 
For the purposes of this paper we regard the supply chain risk to the PDP as 
essentially dominated by the bullwhip effect.  For such a context the Sterman, (2000) 
“boom-and-burst” descriptor is extremely apt.  During the boom phase the risk of 
incurring excess costs in Equation 1 includes all the extra costs paid for rapid 
acquisition of more materials, overtime premiums and learning curve effects, and 
frequently compounded by the impact of lower quality upping the reject rate.  Hence 
boom induced risks of excessive costs are primarily impacting the physical part of 
Equation 1, plus the loss of profit due to stock-outs. 
 
In contrast when the downstream “bust” occurs the businesses throughout the chain 
are stuck with unwanted stock.  This is lying around at many levels in the supply 
chain.  Hence excess holding costs are immediately incurred.  But the risk to profit 
does not end there, since two further negative factors come into play.  The first is 
fairly obvious, since stock is written down, and disposed of in the inevitable retail 
“sale”.  Prices (and hence profit margins) are slashed just to generate cash and to 
make room for the next delivery (which may already be on its way).  But there is still 
the very subtle factor of “cannibalisation”.  In this case the canny customer will buy 
two items at the reduced price now.  One is to use immediately, but the second is an 
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advance purchase of a substitute for next year’s model.  Hence the chance of a full 
price sale next year is also foregone. 
 
As we have argued previously, at any particular echelon within the supply chain it is 
clearly a good idea to avoid generating unnecessary bullwhip.  We have previously 
detailed a suitable algorithm which achieves this goal under carefully defined 
conditions (Disney and Towill, 2006a).  We now extend that knowledge by 
considering the deleterious effect due to mismatched lead-times when setting target 
inventory and work-in-progress (WIP) levels.  We show the extent to which this 
impacts on supply chain volatility and develop a new theory to establish stability 
limits as a function of this mismatch.  Our results greatly strengthen previous 
arguments for enabling transparency of rapidly circulated high fidelity information 
within the supply chains.  This will considerably reduce risks to profit margins, 
because the likely cost of implementation will be swamped by avoidable bullwhip on-
costs. 
 
2.  Our supply chain replenishment rule 
The particular replenishment rule advocated and exploited in this paper is a special 
case of the automatic pipeline inventory and order based production system 
(APIOBPCS).    It is designed to control delivery when the actual lead-time is Tp. This 
rule readily expressed in words as, 
 
         Let the replenishment orders be equal to the sum of an exponentially 
smoothed demand (averaged over Ta time periods), plus a fraction (1/Ti) of 
the inventory difference between target stock and actual stock, plus a 
fraction (1/Tw) of the difference between target “orders placed but not yet 
received” and actual “orders placed but not yet received” (John et al., 1994). 
 
John et al (1994) also highlights the importance of utilising the “best” lead-time  
estimate, pT , currently available in setting the target “orders placed but not yet 
received” (or WIP level) if inventory drift is to be reduced.  As we shall see later, the 
practical benefit of so doing is in fact much greater than just solving this previously 
identified problem. 
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The APIOBPCS model encapsulates the general principles for replenishment rules as 
advocated by Popplewell and Bonney (1987).  In particular it gives due prominence to 
the importance of including pipeline (WIP) feedback in replenishment decision 
making, a factor further emphasised by Bonney (1990).  Of course the APIOBPCS 
principle is not a new concept.  It is empirically well established in industry (Coyle, 
1977), and has the additional advantage of reasonably describing performance data 
from 2000 Beer Game “plays” as elegantly modelled by Sterman (1989).  
Furthermore the particular variant known as the “to-make model” has successfully if 
rather pragmatically controlled 6,000 multi-product pipelines in the UK orthopaedic 
components industry.  This was via exploitation of empirically derived parameter 
settings (Cheema et al, 1989). 
 
Deserved customer service levels can be ensured with the APIOBPCS model by the 
use of a target stock level.  This can be set arbitrarily and does not affect the stability 
or variance ratios between the demand variance and the order (or inventory) variance 
in a linear system (an assumption we make herein). Thus in theory, with a high 
enough target stock level, any desired availability or fill-rate (or any other measure) 
can be achieved. Indeed, by exploiting the classic “newsboy” principle, the target 
stock level can be set to the critical fractile that ensures the optimum economic stock-
out probability is achieved, Disney et al (2006b). 
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Figure 5.  Parameter settings guaranteeing unity bullwhip with matched lead 
times  
(Source: Disney and Towill, 2006a)  
 
 
A very simple, but operationally profound, and highly recommended modification to 
APIOBPCS is undertaken by making Tw=Ti.  This simplified model is designated DE-
APIOBPCS as this streamlinging was first advocated by Deziel and Eilon (1967) 
researching within an OR context.  A simple but powerful demonstration of the 
importance of the DE settings of (Tw=Ti) is available in the analysis by Disney and 
Towill (2003) and it generally results in a very good dynamic response.  Such a 
modification also has the great benefit of hugely simplifying the subsequent 
mathematical analysis.  Typically the estimation of bullwhip is much more tractable 
and we are able to generate the unit bullwhip contours shown in Figure 5.  By setting 
the replenishment rule parameters to the values shown on the graph then for idealised 
conditions and random demand, bullwhip is avoided if Tp = pT . 
 
In theory Figure 5 provides the user with helpful guidelines based on mathematical 
analysis.  This contrasts with previous pragmatic approaches such as Towil et all 
(1997) to parameter settings in which bullwhip levels were inferred rather than 
calculated.  The relevant bullwhip and inventory calculations for system synthesis 
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may be undertaken from the Appendices and are listed in Table 2.  The full 
implications of these results will be discussed in the next section.  
 
 
De
sig
n 
Replenishment 
rule settings 
(based on 
expected lead 
time) 
Predicted performance 
Expected lead time  1 and 1  pp TT  Extended lead times with adaptive control  3 and 3  pp TT  
Extended lead time 
with non-adaptive 
control  3 and 1p pT T   
(1/Tί) 1/(1+Ta) Bullwhip Inventory variance 
Bullwhip
 
Inventory 
variance 
Bullwhip 
 
Inventory 
variance 
1 0.1 0.803 1 2.205 1.352 4.781 1.028 4.946 
2 0.2 0.626 1 2.392 1.586 5.432 1.148 6.229 
3 0.4 0.371 1 2.541 1.727 5.915 1.747 9.609 
4 0.6 0.216 1 2.417 1.612 5.515 2.848 13.498 
5 0.8 0.102 1 2.209 1.356 4.794 5.502 21.164 
 
Table 2. “Steady State” performance for the APIOBPCS replenishment rule 
(Source:  Authors) 
 
3.  Impact of mismatched lead-times 
In a previous paper we had benchmarked bullwhip via mathematical analysis for the 
design case where pT =Tp (Disney and Towill, 2006a).  Hence the first two sections of 
Table 2 result for ( pT =Tp=1; and for pT =Tp=3) are already established in the 
literature.  In other words a reasonable degree of system robustness is self-evident.  
For example, Design 1 has unity bullwhip for the expected value of Tp=1, but which 
has a modest increase up to 1.352 if Tp increases to 3 (provided this is known and 
used to adjust pT accordingly).  Design 5 is also comparable in nominal performance, 
so if the appropriate information is available and used, no unexpected problems arise.  
This broad equivalence is confirmed in the simulated responses shown in Figure 6.  
Inc
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Figure 6.  Two replenishment systems with similar bullwhip performance 
(Source:  Authors) 
 
But in reality the situation is actually much worse than suggested by the “steady state” 
theory of Table 2.  This is because as shown in Figure 7, Design 5 exhibits a very 
lightly damped response mode which should always be a cause for concern.  As we 
show in the Appendices, for a stable system our theory has now been advanced to 
estimate bullwhip and inventory variance for the more challenging situation in which 
pT ≠ Tp.  Thus, the right hand section of Table 2 is Tp=3, pT =1 is completely new and 
novel.  It is now immediately apparent from these results that this large lead time 
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mismatch has destroyed the previously apparent congruence between Design 1 and 
Design 5.  Whereas the former system has coped with the lead-time “ignorance” very 
well, the latter is now quite volatile.  As a consequence risk of profit reduction is 
much greater.  In other words, for such a system the “tipping point” (Gladwell, 2000) 
for a potentially disastrous instability may be close at hand. 
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 (a) Design 1 when 1pT  and Tp=3 throughout the simulation 
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 (b)   Design 5 when 1pT  and Tp=3 throughout the simulation 
  
Figure 7.  Different behaviours with mismatched lead times  
(Source:  Authors) 
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4.  A solution to this problem: Effective adaptive control 
We now show that adaptive control of the replenishment rule does indeed provide a 
much better response and hence reduced risk of bullwhip lowering profitability.  
Figure 8 shows schematically how this is enabled by building a current lead time 
estimator into the WIP feedback path.  Hence, in the adaptive system the WIP target 
is automatically adjusted in line with the observed actual value of Tp.  As Towill et al 
(1997) has posited this updating process can itself be a variable and some form of 
exponential smoothing may be a useful option.  However for the purpose of 
illustration herein, we shall assume the adaptive loop operates instantaneously when 
the new information is received.  Smoothing could, of course, be helpful if the data 
source used for updating the lead time estimate is “noisy”. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.  Adaptive target WIP loop added to the replenishment system 
(Adapted from Towill et al, 1997) 
 
Figure 9 shows the simulated response of the delivery system with and without the 
proposed adaption.  The differences in performance are quite startling.  Whereas the 
non-adaptive system is extremely volatile, the adaptive scheme results in a well 
damped response.  The former will certainly induce significant additional costs (and 
hence reduce profits) due to the completely system induced cyclic behaviour about the 
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trend line.  Furthermore such on-costs are unlikely to be restricted to this particular 
supply chain echelon.  There could additionally be significant knock-on effects at all 
upstream stages as well.  As Burbidge (1984) remarked, in his vast experience if there 
is any chance or such a domino effect happening, then it almost certainly will. 
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 (a) Non-adaptive controls. Design 5 when 1pT  and Tp=1 until time 50, then 
1pT  and Tp=3.  There are 2 period of zero receipts (time periods 50 and 51) 
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 (b) Adaptive controls. Design 5 when 1pT  and Tp=1 until time 50, then 3pT  
and Tp=3.  There are 2 period of zero receipts (time periods 50 and 51). 
 
Figure 9.  Improved dynamic response via adaptive control implementation 
(Source:  Authors) 
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4.1. Extended stability analysis 
Disney and Towill, (2005) have previously shown the stability condition for the 
particular case where actual lead time and expected lead time are equal turns out to be 
beautifully simple.  The value for Ti  (when Tw=Ti) just has to be greater than 0.5, and 
this parameter value is independent of Tp and of course pT .  The actual response will 
vary according to the value of Ti selected, as the bullwhip and inventory variances 
listed in Table 2 confirm.  However the earlier paper left the issue of any problems 
arising from pp TT   to be resolved by the use of a suitable simulation model to 
enable answers to “what if” questions.  In other words the results previously shown in 
Figure 7 are typical of what might be expected. 
 
 
Figure 10. Confirmation of the stability boundary due to mismatch in lead times 
(Source:  Authors) 
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But this particular output has caused us to investigate the problem in even greater 
depth as a prelude to reducing bullwhip induced risk.  Hence our theory has now been 
greatly extended via Appendix I (for stability analysis) and via Appendix II (for 
subsequent estimation of bullwhip and inventory variance) for a stable system.  The 
concerned mathematics is rather specialised and tedious.  However the dramatic 
output of Figure A1 is of interest in two important respects.  Firstly there is no longer 
a simple stability relationship between Ti and Tp as it clearly depends on pT .  
Secondly the “safe zone” for system operation is now a peculiar shape in the Ti versus 
pT  plane.  This is due to the contours for a given value of Tp being discontinuous in 
slope at more than one point in the plane. 
 
How these results affect parameter settings and operating scenarios will be discussed 
in detail in the next section.  Here we are concerned with cross-checking and hence 
validating the theoretical results shown in Appendix A.  To do this we have simulated 
three different systems, all with the expected lead time pT = 1 unit, reacting to a unit 
impulse in demand.  The control parameters have been arbitrarily kept at Ta = ∞, Ti = 
Tw = 1.  However Tp takes on the values 1, 2, and 3 in turn.  The simulation output to 
an arbitrary input are shown in Fig. 9.  As expected, when Tp = 1 we have a well 
behaved stable response.  But if the actual lead time increases to Tp = 2 the system 
becomes dramatically unstable (note the vertical scale has been substantially changed 
to make the point that this response is widely fluctuating).  Finally, increasing Tp = 3 
results in a continuously oscillating system.  This is critically stable, but of course is 
still risking reduced profit via unnecessary volatility when the demand is actually 
quiescent. 
 
 5.  Procedures for reducing bullwhip induced risk 
The kind of situation reviewed in this paper is not uncommon in industrial operations.  
For example, execution at a UK manufacturer with a value stream audited via the 
“Quick Scan” procedure (Naim et al 2002) recognized the importance of minimising 
lead-times.  It therefore implemented a performance related pay system for rewarding 
its sourcing managers.  Consequently the more suppliers the managers could persuade 
to achieve “next day” delivery, the higher would be their bonuses. The data for this 
bonus calculation was unreasonably not taken from the MRP system.  But the 
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managers, realising this, set the lead-times in the MRP system to unity, despite not 
having actually agreed with the suppliers the new, reduced lead-time.  In order to 
mark the effect of actual lead-times, the managers increased the safety stock.  
However, irrespective of the wrong doing becoming self evident via executive walk-
about, our analysis suggests that this is an inadequate action.  There is still a 
considerable danger that using such wrong information will result in an unstable (or at 
least a critically stable system therein), incurring yet more avoidable bullwhip on-
costs. 
 
Nor is such practice the only way of inducing chaos on the shop floor.  We also have 
UK industrial experience of lead-time discrepancies occurring the other way around.  
Sometimes it is possible that a supplier, foreseeing a period of high workload in the 
near future, wants to deliver components early (but on a temporary basis).  This may 
be due to requirements either to free up factory space or to reduce the burden or the 
transport system.  An unstable system could result because the recipient company has 
built the shortened lead-time into the replenishment rule.  But if there is close liaison 
between “players” in the value stream then this reduction would be flagged up as a 
transient expedient.  It could then be treated as a known “interface” problem and be 
accounted for by appropriate action from the production scheduler.  However, in 
contrast, the previously documented case of achieving bonus targets by manipulating 
data so as to benefit particular managers is an “internal” problem.  As suggested 
earlier it can be detected by the Production Director going on a walk-about. 
 
So on the basis of our investigations, what actions do we suggest in order to minimise 
risk of bullwhip induced reduced profits?  A number of complementary actions are 
recommended as follows;  Always monitor lead times automatically and update the replenishment rule 
accordingly. This is entirely within “our” remit.  Strive to have speedy transparent high fidelity information flow speedily 
throughout the value stream.  However it must be understood that considerable 
management effort and tenacity is needed to ensure that the right information 
actually flows between all “players”. 
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     Set the replenishment rule parameters very conservatively and well within our 
published stability contours.  This will dampen down response to lead-time 
induced transients at the expense of a longer recovery period.  Highlight lead-time changes so that when necessary a manual override is 
triggered.  In other words the need for this action moves the product into the 
5% “high activity” category from the 95% “automatic replenishing” group. 
 
In short we need to establish both the likely operating scenario and the necessary IT 
support required to enable bullwhip risk to be minimised.  This includes regularly 
exploiting simulation models to answer “what-if” questions by regularly forecasting 
product lead times when these might vary due to unavoidable and always changing 
complexities in shop floor scheduling and routing (Belk and Steels, 1998).  
Furthermore, adaptive replenishment rule parameter settings need to be related to 
current high fidelity information.  Finally, to ensure that actual lead-times for all 
products are known to the production scheduler.  Appropriately triggered intervention 
then determines if this particular product switches from automatic replenishment to 
“hands-on” mode. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
Bullwhip is a costly phenomenon with many possible causes (Geary et al 2006).  
Furthermore it may be triggered anywhere within the supply chain.  The project 
described herein is based on constricting one particular yet known common cause of 
bullwhip.  This is the particular dynamic response induced by decision makers 
(usually people under great pressure) who consequently generate demand 
amplification via their “preferred” and often intuitive replenishment rule.  
Unfortunately such behaviour does not merely increase the risk of unnecessary on-
costs arising for the incumbent echelon alone.  As the Holmström (1997) study 
illustrates, there is a very good chance that, such a phenomenon will make matters 
much worse else-where in the supply chain.  Other “players” will be wrong-footed 
and take what they consider to be appropriate compensatory action.  Unfortunately the 
likelihood is that by now everything in the value stream is happening out-of-phase 
with each other.  Thus, chaotic patterns of supply and demand become inevitable and 
can be disastrous for business. 
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Our theoretical investigations have already provided a neat DSS based theory for 
avoiding bullwhip in the matched lead-time case (Disney and Towill, 2006a).  
However if mismatch should occur in practice then bullwhip can unexpectedly 
appear.  Under extreme conditions an unstable system can result.  Hence our theory 
has now further evolved to cover this very demanding case.  Consequently we are 
able to extend both theory and practice in terms of reducing bullwhip induced risk of 
profit losses via a number of suggested and tested actions.  One of these strongly 
underpins the previous pragmatic approaches to the importance of transparent 
information flow proposed by Goldman et al, (1995) with reference to Carpenter 
Technology Inc. and by Christopher and Lee (2004).  In other words it is just not 
enough to say that accurate lead-time estimates are first “a good thing to have”.  
Properly used they can greatly reduce on-costs arising from demand amplification. 
Appendix A:  System stability with mismatched lead times 
 
The general form of a discrete transfer function can be written in z operator terms as 
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The transfer function of our particular replenishment system that relates the order rate 
placed on our supply source to the demand rate received from our customer is given 
by 
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The stability boundary of the system is determined by the denominator of this transfer 
function.  For the purpose of determining system stability Disney (2007) highlights a 
criterion based upon matrices of the coefficients of the denominator that is very direct.  
In essence it is a trivial extension of Jury’s Inners well established approach, Jury 
(1974).  It has the considerable virtue that it is extremely easy to automate with a 
computer.  The method involves creating the following matrices, 
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The required system stability boundary is then given by the largest root of the matrix 
equation 
011n   nna YX .        (A4) 
Using such a procedure results Ta>-0.5 and Ti>x, where x is calculated and listed in 
Table A1.  This highlights the minimum value of Ti required to ensure a stable 
response for different values of Tp and pT .  Note that as befits our “hardware” 
engineering origins, we would traditionally opt for a well damped conservative design 
when setting parameter values (Towill, 1970).  This means aiming to operate well 
away from the stability boundary.  In this case a relatively large value of Ti  is required 
to achieve this goal, as already found experimentally in Table 2. 
The range in stability requirements according to Tp and pT  shown in Table A1 is both 
surprisingly wide and indeed fluctuating.  Note that the leading diagonal with pT = Tp 
requiring Ti =0.5 confirms the validity of this particular boundary as previously 
established for DE-APIOBPCS by Disney and Towill (2003).  What is surprising is 
how the boundary shifts around according to the relative values of Tp and pT .  To 
visually make this point strongly, Figure A1 charts these results using Tp as the 
baseline.  The pT = Tp boundary is also highlighted. 
 
The fluctuating behaviour of the limiting parameter values for stability is a manifestly 
a cause for considerable concern by the practising production controller.  Of course in 
real-world business there is an extremely simple answer.  But unfortunately it may not 
always be within individual company control.  If the actual lead time Tp is known for 
each product, and the estimate Tp is continuously updated, then effective supply chain 
management and bullwhip control become much easier.  The bullwhip benchmarking 
contours can then be used with much confidence.  In practice there will be only a 
negligible risk of higher volatility than we have previously predicted (Disney and 
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Towill, 2006a).  So an investigation which initially studied bullwhip induced risk has 
resulted in yet stronger evidence supporting effective information exchange within the 
supply chain.  Hence the narrative on this topic pragmatically advanced by 
Christopher and Lee (2004) is confirmed via transfer function analysis. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure A1.  The minimum Ti required for stability with mismatched lead-times 
(Source: Authors) 
 
 
 
Ti Tp 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
pT  
1 0.5 1.5 1 1.5 1.237942 1.5 1.338696 1.5 4.960145 5.604426 1.421052 1.5 
2 1.414214 0.5 1.465571 1.618034 1 1.738208 2.433752 3.11124 3.778705 4.439781 5.096432 5.749844 
3 1.903212 1.5 0.5 1.5 1.871349 1.801938 1 1.772719 2.492132 3.187514 3.869238 4.542147 
4 2.073921 2 1.481194 0.5 1.488077 1.973817 2.19203 2 1 1.798914 2.538668 3.250055 
5 2 2.484781 1.945261 1.5 0.5 1.5 2 2.415596 2.479474 2.203616 1.203602 1.819545 
6 1.568152 2.76594 2.61585 1.812077 1.491742 0.5 1.493933 1.980187 2.542253 2.790233 2.749062 2.41002 
7 1.821392 2.87993 3.101712 2.618034 1.857479 1.5 0.5 1.5 1.927929 2.606767 2.99666 3.126265 
8 1.982866 2.839646 3.436618 3.245405 2.544849 1.945303 1.49535 0.5 1.49632 1.924605 2.628309 3.132207 
9 2.064633 2.618034 3.64235 3.732051 3.28101 2.418271 1.98788 1.5 0.5 1.5 1.969616 2.618034 
10 2.072477 2 3.732051 4.098644 3.881728 3.24698 2.24698 2 1.497015 0.5 1.497529 1.993019 
11 2 2.275001 3.709482 4.359662 4.368853 3.939187 3.162761 2.384087 1.989911 1.5 0.5 1.5 
12 1.91618 2.4959 3.563894 4.525255 4.756311 4.521821 3.932966 3.038547 2.489719 1.962352 1.49792 0.5 
 
Table A1. Critical (minimal) values of Ti required for stability for mismatched 
lead times 
(Source: Authors) 
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Appendix B: Bullwhip and inventory variance expressions for the case of 
mismatched lead times 
 
(a)   General case 
 
Using these previously determined matrices (A3) then for a stable system we may 
also estimate the bullwhip variance ratio from the equation 
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where    11n11n   nbn YXYX  with the last row replaced by 
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The corresponding inventory variance expression is given by 
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where the coefficients now obviously relate to the transfer function of the inventory 
levels.  This transfer function is   
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(b)  Specific cases when pp TT   
 
This procedure further requires us to specify a value of Tp and pT , but this can also be 
computed even for very high order systems.  For the particular case when Tp=1 and 
pT =3 then the bullwhip expression becomes 
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which is arrived at by working through the ensuing tedious, but straightforward 
algebra. The corresponding inventory variance expression when Tp=1 and pT =3  is 
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When Tp=3 and pT =1 the following expressions for bullwhip and inventory variance 
are obtained. 
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(b)   The special case of equal lead times pp TT   
 
In the previously evaluated case of pp TT   then the closed form bullwhip estimate 
becomes 
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Bullwhip    . (B8) 
 
Equation (B8) is especially interesting as it holds for all lead-times (when pp TT  ).   
As does the inventory variance expression.  It is 
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